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INTRODUCTION
Today, copyright infringement is made possible because of the
technology available in our digital world.1 Digital technology
includes computers, storage devices, and peer-to-peer (“P2P”) filesharing services.2 So if one combines these and connects them to a
media player, like an Apple TV, he or she can choose from
countless unauthorized files of copyrighted material to enjoy on a
big screen television set. In fact, one can do this within minutes,
without the tedious intermediary step of obtaining permission from
the copyright holders.3 But who should be liable for the copyright
infringement? The situation below illustrates the different roles
involved in a typical act of copyright infringement. While reading
it, one should try to decide who should be held liable:

1
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Apple Rips While Grokster Burns: How MGM
v. Grokster Benefits Information Technology Companies, FINDLAW LEGAL NEWS &
COMMENTARY, Jun. 29, 2005, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20050629_
sunder.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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College student, Billy, likes to spend his Sunday afternoons
downloading free popular songs and movies he had just heard and
watched on Friday and Saturday nights. On one particular Sunday
afternoon, Billy decides he wants to download the new Borat
movie,4 so he logs on to BitTorrent, a P2P file-distribution tool that
allows his computer to trade information with another computer
directly.5 After performing a quick search for Borat on BitTorrent,
Billy gets a list of computers that are readily available to send him
the information he wants. He selects one computer, and with the
click of a button and a few seconds, Billy has the Borat movie
downloaded onto his computer. Now he decides he wants to watch
the movie, but his seventeen-inch computer screen is much too
small to enjoy it. So Billy decides to watch Borat on his sixty-inch
flat screen television for better picture, sound and viewing quality.
Grabbing his new Apple TV, a set-top box (“STB”),6 he wirelessly
transfers that digital video clip stored in his computer onto his
television. With this elaborate setup, Billy enjoys the Borat film
for free, instead of purchasing or renting it from a local retailer,
and it only took a few minutes of his time.
Many courts would agree that Billy is liable for directly
infringing the copyrights of Borat.
But should hardware
manufacturers of devices that help facilitate copyright
infringement, like Apple, also be held liable for the direct
infringement of its users? What if its products are well-known for
holding unauthorized copyrighted works? Should P2P file-sharing
services be held liable for the copyright infringement? If P2P filesharing services intend to induce copyright infringement with
advertisements, should they be held liable? If Apple does not
intend for its products, like Apple TV, to induce copyright
4

BORAT: CULTURAL LEARNINGS OF AMERICA FOR MAKE BENEFIT GLORIOUS NATION
(20th Century Fox 2006).
5
Electronic Commerce, Glossary, http://www.martech-intl.com/best2/glossary.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (defining peer-to-peer as a process “involving linking a series
of PCs together without the use of a server”); Wikipedia.org, BitTorrent,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (defining BitTorrent as
a peer-to-peer (P2P) file distribution protocol written by programmer Bram Cohen and
debuted at CodeCon 2002).
6
Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited
Mar. 1, 2007).
OF KAZAKHSTAN
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infringement, but the Apple TV nonetheless does, should it be held
liable as a contributory infringer? What if it uses contemporary
internet lingo to advertise Apple TV’s ability to “Rip, Mix, Burn”7
videos to potential users, as it did with the iPod? Is it liable then?
Perhaps, under the new “intent to induce” theory adopted by the
Supreme Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster.8
This Note shows that there are two ways to read the “intent to
induce” theory announced in Grokster III, one of which would
leave practically all manufacturers and distributors of digital
technology susceptible to liability. According to the Grokster III
Court, defendants Grokster and StreamCast were potentially liable
for “inducing” copyright infringement.9 The Court held that
“inducement” meant, “one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
is liable” for a third party’s infringement.10 Originally, plaintiff,
MGM, brought a cause of action against the defendants under the
traditional theories of secondary liability, namely, contributory
infringement and vicarious infringement.11
However,
defendants—like other P2P file-sharing services—claimed
protection under Sony Corporation of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc.12 Essentially, this rule of law entitles products or
services “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” to
manufacture and distribution protection, even if they would
otherwise be held responsible under the theory of contributory
7

See Kathy Bowrey, Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law,
FIRST MONDAY, Jul. 22, 2005, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_8/bowrey
(citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 9 (Random House 2001)).
8
(Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
9
Id. at 941. The Supreme Court could not determine the defendants’ liability because
the case was appealing the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and the Court had to
base its decision on facts accepted at the district court level. The case was therefore
remanded to the district court to determine the defendants’ liability. See Grokster III,
545 U.S. at 927.
10
Id. at 936–37.
11
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003), overruled by Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913.
12
See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), stating that, “StreamCast has adduced evidence that the
Morpheus program is regularly used to facilitate and search for public domain materials,
government documents . . . .”).
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infringement.13 However, the Court did not hold the defendants
liable under either of the traditional theories, instead focusing on
the inapplicability of the Sony defense to the defendants, and then
announcing the new rule. So it left readers wondering how to
properly interpret the inducement theory.14
Knowing this
background of Grokster III, one can see that there are two ways the
theory can be read. First, it can be read as a rebuttal against the
Sony defense for claims of contributory infringement. Or, it can be
read as a new cause of action under secondary liability. The first
reading effectively sets boundaries on the Sony defense. However,
allowing copyright holders to bring a wholly separate cause of
action against contributory infringers under the second reading
preempts defendants from using the Sony defense altogether. Such
a reading is beneficial for copyright holders looking to pin the
responsibility for copyright infringement on corporations with
deep pockets. But is this the desired result?
Reading the inducement theory as a new cause of action creates
liability for new technologies worthy of the Sony defense, like the
Apple TV.15 However, it is important to understand that the
Grokster III Court never wanted to hold digital technology
producers, like Apple, liable for facilitating copyright
infringement. Rather, the Court preferred to uphold the policy
expressed in Sony: to balance the dissemination of new digital
technology products, while also giving copyright holders their fair
protection.16 That is, the Grokster III Court sought not to answer
the question of who should be held liable, but rather, how to
prevent further copyright infringement when using products of
information technology.
13

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Ninth Circuit reading was in error
because it did not displace other theories of secondary liability and then continuing with
the inducement theory after dismissing the Ninth’s Circuit’s reading); William Sloan
Coats, Mark R. Weinstein, Erik R. Zimmerman, Pre- and Post-Grokster Copyright
Infringement Liability for Secondary and Tertiary Parties, 842 PLI/Pat 221, 242–43
(2005).
15
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243.
16
See Transcript of Oral Argument at *12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S, 913 (No. 04-480)
(questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is] non-infringing”).
Justice Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who cannot gauge its
unforeseen uses before he has invented it. Id.
14
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This Note attempts to illustrate how the Supreme Court
addresses the copyright infringement problem today, while at the
same time maintaining the safe harbor of Sony17 for products of
information technology in Grokster III.18 This Note argues that the
Grokster III holding must be read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense
under the contributory infringement theory in cases of secondary
liability. To view the inducement theory as a new cause of action
under secondary liability could lead to its misapplication, striking
the wrong balance between dissemination and protection. In fact,
it would preclude new technologies, like the Apple TV, from
developing substantial noninfringing uses.19
Part I of this Note discusses the history of secondary liability.
Part I.A gives the background of the original theories and the
article of commerce doctrine. Part I.B discusses the Sony decision.
Part II addresses the legal consequences of Sony’s inconsistent
definition of “substantial noninfringing uses.”20 Part II.A begins
with a short description of how P2P file-sharing works. Part II.B
delineates the Grokster II and Grokster III21 decisions in the Ninth
Circuit and Supreme Court. Part II.C addresses Congress’ role in
the Grokster III decision. Part III discusses the different ways to
read the Grokster III decision and their possible implications. Part
III.A uses the Apple TV to illustrate how Grokster III should not
be read. Part III.B. reconciles the Sony and Grokster III decisions
by using the Apple TV to show that the Grokster III holding must
be read as part of contributory infringement and a rebuttal to the
Sony decision. Part IV briefly summarizes the point of this Note
that the Grokster III decision never intended to eliminate the Sony
protection.

17

464 U.S. at 442.
Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913.
19
For a discussion of other gaps in secondary liability theory by the Grokster decision,
see Britton Payne, Note, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book
Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering Solution for Infringing Digital Creations,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939 (2006).
20
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (defining substantial noninfringing uses as “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses” in one passage and “commercially significant
noninfringing uses” in another passage).
21
Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913.
18
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I. HOW DID COURTS HOLD MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF PRODUCTS CAPABLE OF COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT LIABLE IN A PRE-GROKSTER III WORLD?
THE HISTORY OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
Before the Grokster III decision, courts traditionally held
producers and providers liable for third party copyright
infringements under theories of vicarious liability and contributory
infringement.22 P2P service users directly infringe on copyright
owners’ exclusive rights to reproduce, produce derivatives,
distribute copies, and publicly perform or display their work under
§ 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act when P2P users transmit
copyrighted work without owners’ permission.23 Parties are held
responsible under secondary liability for this infringement if they
have some degree of involvement in the direct infringement.24 The
theories of secondary liability were not codified in the Copyright
Act. Instead, the Supreme Court and lower courts adopted them
over time as needed from the Patent Act, where they are expressly
stated, even though the Patent Act entitles holders to a completely
different intellectual property right.25
Congress has also
acknowledged the theories of secondary liability for copyright law
in legislative history.26 The “staple articles of commerce” doctrine
as construed by Sony is a defense to these liability theories that will
also be discussed.27
A. Origins of Secondary Liability Theories and the Staple Article
of Commerce Doctrine
Vicarious liability for acts of direct infringement is imposed on
a secondary party if that party has a right and ability to control
infringing conduct and derives a financial benefit from that

22

Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 868–72 (2004).
23
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Coats et al., supra note 14, at 226–27 (2005).
24
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227.
25
Id. at 226–27; see also Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to
Infringe” Under Patent Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2006).
26
Feder, supra note 22, at 868–69.
27
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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conduct.28 This Note does not focus on vicarious liability because
the Sony and Grokster III decisions focused on the defendants’
liability under a theory of contributory infringement.29 It is worthy
to note, though, that vicarious liability is a cause of action
copyright holders typically bring in addition to contributory
infringement, but the defendants’ primary defense is Sony and
courts almost always associate that defense with contributory
infringement.30 So, if defendants are found not to be contributory
infringers, as the defendants in Sony, they are also not liable for
vicarious infringement.31 Also, if defendants are found to be
contributory infringers, as the defendants in Grokster III, that is
enough to find them liable and the court will not address the
vicarious liability issue.32
Under its traditional standard, a party is a contributory infringer
if it has “knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”33
Depending on the alleged contributory infringer’s degree of
involvement in the infringing activity, knowledge of the direct
infringer’s conduct is satisfied by either actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringing activity.34 Under Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., material contribution usually refers to

28

Feder, supra note 22, at 869.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 931 n.9 (2005)
(stating that, because the Court resolved the case on an inducement theory, there was no
need for it to analyze the vicarious liability claim); Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (holding that
the sale of VTRs to the general public did not constitute contributory infringement).
30
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9 (stating that, because the Court resolved the
case on an inducement theory, there was no need for it to analyze the vicarious liability
claim); In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster II), 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Court recognized that the differences between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability were not clear. Thus, when Sony used the term
“vicarious liability” it did so outside the technical analysis of the vicarious copyright
infringement doctrine; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II),
239 F.3d 1004, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 & n.17).
31
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9; Sony, 464 U.S. at 422.
32
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9 (stating that, because the Court resolved the
case on an inducement theory, there was no need for it to analyze the vicarious liability
claim).
33
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971); Feder, supra note 22, at 871.
34
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439).
29
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providing the “site and facilities” for the direct infringement to
take place.35 It can also mean engaging in behavior that qualifies
as “substantial participation” in the infringing act.36 The copyright
version of contributory infringement is derived from the tort
concept of enterprise liability.37 In enterprise liability, the person
who knowingly participates in an enterprise, or an unlawful
activity, is held to be just as responsible for the consequences that
result from that enterprise as his partner or partners in that
enterprise, even if his or her role is only a subsidiary one.38
Traditionally, courts used secondary liability theories to hold
beneficiaries of direct copyright infringement accountable for that
direct copyright infringement.39
However, as technology
developed, courts and Congress had to increasingly consider how
to construct the law so as to allow for works protected under
copyright to be more easily accessible to society.40 A prime
example of the promotion of this policy was the Sony case, in
which the courts sought to protect the advancement of technology,
even where it was clear that the technology could be used to
infringe copyrights.41 There, the courts had to weigh the interests
of copyright holders in their right to protection against distributors’
right to competition and society’s right to copyrighted goods.42 So
the Court again adopted another theory from patent law and used
35

76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227;
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163.
36
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 227 (quoting Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163).
37
Feder, supra note 22, at 871.
38
Id. at 871–72.
39
Id. at 870 (“imposing cost on the beneficiary of the infringement . . . satisfies basic
notions of fairness and reasonableness”); see Oswald, supra note 25 at 225–26.
40
See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 440
(1984) (referencing the patent law justification for adopting the staple article of
commerce doctrine: “[w]hen a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely
on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a patent, the
public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated”); see also
id. at 428–29 (stating that, under the Constitution, Congress is charged with defining the
scope of a copyright holder’s monopoly).
41
See id. at 423 (finding that “time-shifting” was the primary, legal use of the VTR, but
a survey also showed that a substantial number of interviewees were building libraries of
tapes, which was not deemed legal); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster II),
334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
42
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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the “staple article of commerce” doctrine to determine how to
properly weigh these interests.43
Section 271(c) of Title 35 defines a staple article of commerce
by giving a narrow list of non-staple articles of commerce44. This
list only includes those items that have “no commercial use except
in connection with [the] patented invention.”45 This means that
only those articles that are capable of substantial non-commercial,
noninfringing uses are staple articles of commerce.46
In Sony, the Court reasoned that the “staple article of
commerce” doctrine could be adopted by copyright law because of
the “historic kinship” that patent and copyright law shared.47
Indeed, the kinship the Sony Court referred to probably was the
practice of exporting secondary liability theories from patent law
into copyright law.48 As will be shown below, after Sony, any
inquiry into whether or not a product is a “staple article of
commerce” entails application of the substantive “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses” standard.49
Various lawsuits against P2P providers have applied the Sony
holding to determine whether or not their services are entitled to
protection.50 Copyright holders have depended on interpreting the
meaning of “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” to hold P2P
providers liable.51
B. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.
In 1976, owners of copyright in television programming sued
Sony for manufacturing and distributing Betamax videotape

43

Id. at 440
Feder, supra note 22, at 889 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176, 200 (1980)).
45
Id. (quoting Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 184).
46
Id.
47
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439.
48
See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 226–27.
49
See id. at 442; Feder, supra note 222, at 889.
50
See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232.
51
See Feder, supra note 22, at 888 (giving three justifications plaintiffs have used to
distinguish Sony from the defendants’ cases in Napster II and Aimster II).
44
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recorders (“VTRs”).52
VTRs enabled consumers to make
unauthorized copies of their programming by including a tuner
device that could record television broadcasts, including plaintiffs’
copyrighted audiovisual work.53 Consequently, copyright owners
asked the trial court to find Sony liable for copyright infringement
under the theory of contributory infringement.54 Under these
theories, Sony was alleged to provide consumers with the means to
infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.55 Indeed, the district court found
that some of the Betamax users were creating libraries of tapes so
they could watch programs multiple times, which was an
unauthorized use of the product.56 However, the trial court also
found that the primary use of the VTR was “time-shifting,” which
means recording a program that was broadcast on television,
watching it once at a later time, and then erasing the recording.57
Time-shifting was considered a legitimate use of the product.58
When the Supreme Court decided the case, it discussed the
significance of these findings to determine if Sony should be held
contributorily liable.59
The issue to be decided by the Court was framed this way:
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case,
it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may
use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of
copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a
theory.60
The Supreme Court used vicarious liability and contributory
infringement interchangeably and refused to hold Sony liable for

52
Sony, 464 U.S. at 422; Feder, supra note 22, at 872. The VTR is also the forerunner
of the videocassette recorder (VCR). Coats et al., supra note 14, at 228.
53
Sony, 464 U.S. at 422.
54
Id. at 420.
55
Id. at 436 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
56
See id. at 423.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 442.
59
Id. at 443–47.
60
Id. at 439.
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contributory infringement based on a finding of constructive
knowledge.61
To determine Sony’s liability under contributory infringement,
the Supreme Court did not address its separate elements.62 Instead,
it applied the staple article of commerce doctrine to the issue of
copyright law in this case.63 It reasoned that, “[w]hen a charge of
contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an
article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe [an
intellectual property right], the public interest in access to that
article of commerce is necessarily implicated.”64 Under the
doctrine, the Court found that a manufacturer of copying
equipment can defeat a claim of contributory infringement if the
manufacturer shows that the product is capable of “substantial
noninfringing” or “commercially significant noninfringing” uses.65
Since the Court found that the Betamax was capable of such
noninfringing uses, it was shielded from contributory infringement,
even if the elements of knowledge and participation were met.66
The court did not define, or quantify, “commercially significant
noninfringing” uses. In Sony’s case, just one capability of the
VTR, time-shifting, was enough to establish its “commercially
significant noninfringing” use.67 The Supreme Court determined
that this potential use was substantially noninfringing for two
reasons. First, the Court focused on the quantity of unauthorized
use. It noted that the plaintiffs’ programs collectively represented
less than ten percent of the total broadcast market, and that the
outcome of the litigation would have a significant impact on the

61

In re Aimster Copyright Litig (Aimster II), 334 F. 3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003). The
Court recognized that the differences between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability were not clear. Thus, when Sony used the term
“vicarious liability” it did so outside the technical analysis of the vicarious copyright
infringement doctrine. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d
1004, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 435).
62
Feder, supra note 22, at 875.
63
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439–40.
64
Id. at 440.
65
See id. at 442.
66
Id.; Feder, supra note 22, at 876.
67
Feder, supra note 22, at 876; Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; Coats et al., supra note 14,
at 229.
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other ninety percent.68 This ninety percent included copyright
owners who had no objection to viewers taping their programs at
home.69 Since the quantity of authorized use was significant
enough to outweigh unauthorized time-shifting of the plaintiffs’
programming, the Court refused to hold Sony liable for
contributory infringement.70
Second, the Court focused on quality. Even if time-shifting
plaintiffs’ programming was unauthorized, the Court found it was
fair use and the VTR was capable of substantial noninfringing uses
because it was non-commercial and did not cause plaintiffs any
significant harm.71 Accordingly, Sony’s sale of the Betamax
VTRs was not an act of contributory infringement.72
In determining Sony’s liability, the Supreme Court
inconsistently expressed when the “substantial noninfringing uses”
protection should apply. This allowed the circuit courts to decide
for themselves the significance of a product’s potential or existing
noninfringing uses.
Eventually, different interpretations of
“substantial noninfringing” uses caused a split in the circuit courts
and set the stage for Grokster III.73 In one passage, the Court
stated that the technology owner must show that its product “need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses” in order to be
protected.74 However, in discussing Sony’s liability, the Court said
that the question was, “whether the Betamax is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses.”75 This passage
suggests that the existing noninfringing uses must be “substantial
and commercially significant” to trigger protection from
contributory infringement claims.76 So, depending on how the
68

Sony, 464 U.S. at 443.
See id.
70
Id. at 446 (reasoning that a finding of contributory infringement would “frustrate the
interests of broadcasters” included in the ninety percent who did not object to timeshifting).
71
Id. at 454 (quoting the district court opinion).
72
Id. at 456.
73
Karen M. Kramer, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster—The Supreme Court’s
Balancing Act Between the Risks of Third-Party Liability for Copyright Infringement and
Rewards of Innovation, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169, 173 (2005).
74
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
75
Kramer, supra note 73, at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. 442).
76
Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
69
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deciding court interprets “substantial noninfringing uses” in Sony,
either a nominal or strong showing of legitimate, noninfringing
uses will protect manufacturers or distributors who would
otherwise be implicated for contributory infringement.77 In P2P
file distribution cases of contributory infringement, Circuit Courts
were split on how much weight to give evidence of legitimate
noninfringing uses.78 Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit in
Napster and Grokster II focused on the “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” aspect of Sony, the Seventh Circuit in Aimster
focused on the “capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses” language.79
II. CHANGING SECONDARY LIABILITY HISTORY:
THE DIGITAL WORLD AND THE GROKSTER III DECISION
A. What is P2P File-Sharing?
P2P file distribution systems enable their users to reproduce
and distribute digital files, including digital files containing
copyrighted works over the Internet.80 Most of these are
unauthorized transmittals of music and video files and they
infringe on owners’ copyrights.81 Several courts determined these
transmittals were not fair use primarily because users were making
exact replicates of the music, which significantly conflicted with

77

Id.
Id. at 174.
79
Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1162 n.9 (contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of the standard in Sony, 464 U.S. at 1161); see In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster
II), 334 F.3d 643, 653 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring a weighing of the probabilities alleged
for significant noninfringing uses to show that they could actually be used as
noninfringing); see also Seth A. Miller, Peer-to-Peer File Distribution: An Analysis of
Design, Liability, Litigation, and Potential Solutions, 25 REV. LITIG. 181, 206 (2006)
(finding that the Ninth Circuit’s reading of Sony differed greatly from the Seventh
Circuit’s, focusing on the capability for substantial noninfringing uses).
80
See Coats et al., supra note 14, at 231–32; In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster
II), 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
81
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 917–21
(2005).
78
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copyright owners’ exclusive rights.82 Creators or operators of
these P2P systems are not the ones who are actually reproducing or
distributing digital files.83 Instead, the systems create a means for
users to directly receive and send digital files to each other, rather
than by downloading from a single server.84 This process of
downloading from other computers occurs in three steps. First, a
user (this user is called the downloader) searches for another user
computer with the desired file (this user is called the uploader).85
Then, the Internet Protocol address (“IP address”) of the uploader
would be communicated to the downloader.86 Finally, the
downloader directly connects to the uploader and obtains the
desired file.87 In cases of copyright infringement against P2P
networks, the searchable index of downloadable files for each
service was different and courts inquired into the type of
searchable index employed by the service to determine how much
knowledge the service had of users’ infringing activity.88
For example, even though music files were downloaded
directly from other Napster users, Napster maintained the
searchable index of files users downloaded from.89 The Napster
software helped users directly infringe by searching its index of
files for the user’s desired file, and then communicating the IP
address of the uploader to the downloader.90 In helping copyright
infringers find those copyrighted files, Napster was deemed to be
clearly involved with helping the copyright infringers
82

See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that merely copying digital copyrighted files does not add anything to the
work, and courts have been reluctant to find fair use when the original work is merely retransmitted in a different medium (citing Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d
104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).
83
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 920–21 (stating that Grokster and StreamCast were
sued for their users’ reproduction and distribution of copyrighted work).
84
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 231–32.
85
Id. at 232–33.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 233.
88
Id. at 232.
89
See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff’d by, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232.
90
Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 907; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232–33.
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communicate.91 Like Napster, Aimster also operated a central
index of digital files on its server and that was also deemed
illegal.92
After the central index was determined to be in violation of
copyright law, new P2P file-sharing services emerged93 that did
not maintain a central index of available files on their own
servers.94 This lack of a central index made it harder to determine
how much, if any, involvement the P2P networks had in helping
users directly infringe.95 Soon after Napster, these new P2P
networks used one of two means of indexing files available for
download. One method used by StreamCast was a decentralized
system.96 In the decentralized system, the software allowed users
to search for files in the searchable index of every individual user
in the network.97 The other type of indexing employed by
Grokster allowed a few computers, called “supernode computers,”
on the network to be designated as hosts for indexes.98 These
supernode computers located the computers near them on the
network and compiled a list of all the files available on those
computers. Downloaders would then retrieve the desired files
from the supernode computers.99 In both the decentralized and
supernode indexing systems, the distributor of the file-sharing
software did not maintain the infringing files on its own server.100
Because the copyrighted works were being transmitted directly
between the users, Grokster and StreamCast were simply providing
copyright infringers with the software needed to find that
network.101 Therefore, it was harder to determine how much

91

Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 907; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 232–33.
Feder, supra note 22, at 884; Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
93
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235.
94
Id.
95
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (finding that the design of Grokster and StreamCast did
not allow them to have actual knowledge of the direct infringement); Coats et al., supra
note 14, at 235.
96
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235.
97
Id.; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159.
98
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 235; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
99
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
100
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236.
101
Id. at 235–36.
92
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involvement the P2P file-sharing services had, and if they were in
fact contributory infringers.
While the Ninth Circuit decided Napster and the Seventh
Circuit decided Aimster, they both addressed the question of
whether a P2P service was secondarily liable under Sony
differently, but arrived at the same conclusion.102 How these
competing approaches were resolved will be discussed in the
context of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Grokster III. Congress’
role in the matter, as well as the consequences of the Grokster III
decision will also be discussed.
B. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, Ltd.
The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Grokster II
and Grokster III were based on the same facts, yet both took
starkly different paths in determining copyright holders’ rights
against secondary infringers.103 The Ninth Circuit approach and
the Supreme Court decision were based on the facts accepted in the
district court for purposes of defendants’ summary judgment
motion.104 Copyright owners alleged that ninety percent of the
digital files exchanged by users of defendants’ software were
infringing and that the copyright owners owned seventy percent of
that material.105 Despite these allegations, the district court
granted Grokster and StreamCast partial summary judgment on the
issues of contributory and vicarious infringement.106 The Ninth
Circuit then affirmed that ruling based on its own interpretation of
Sony.107 Conversely, the Supreme Court did not use a Sony
interpretation to determine Grokster’s and StreamCast’s liability.
Instead, the defendants were held potentially liable under a new

102

Feder, supra note 22, at 879–80.
See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S, 913; Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154.
104
Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236.
105
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
(Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d by MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (citing district
court opinion).
106
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157.
107
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 927–28.
103
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theory of inducement.108 The following discusses the two different
approaches in Grokster II and Grokster III.109
1. The Ninth Circuit Approach
In Grokster II, the Ninth Circuit extended the contributory
infringement analysis that it developed in Napster by adding a
timing element.110 Adding this timing element effectively raised
the knowledge requirement for holding P2P services liable under
that analysis.111 As in Napster, the court first determined if the
service was capable of significant lawful uses. If it was not, the
defendants would not receive the Sony protection and plaintiffs
only had to show constructive knowledge of users’ direct
infringement.112 But, even if the service was capable of significant
lawful uses, the court would not automatically give it Sony
protection.113 Under Napster, if a service was found to be capable
of significant lawful uses, plaintiffs had to prove “reasonable
knowledge of specific infringing files” to find defendants liable.114
But in Grokster II, the court also held that defendants had to have
actual knowledge at a time when they were “either materially
contributing to the infringement or failing to stop it.”115
When the Ninth Circuit applied this new rule, it first held that
Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software were capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.116 It focused on the “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” aspect of Sony, finding that Grokster was
capable of uses such as debuting unpublished artists’ works.117 In
one case, it even led to a record deal for a band.118 Even if such
uses only constituted ten percent of the total activities as the
108

Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
(Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
109
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236.
110
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161.
111
See id. at 1161–62; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236.
112
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161–62; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236.
113
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161–62.
114
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161 (citing Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004).
115
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 236; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
116
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
117
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161.
118
Id. (referring to Wilco receiving a new recording contract after the successful debut
of its work on Grokster).
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plaintiffs alleged, that was not enough to prove that the software
was not incapable of substantial lawful uses.119 Instead, the ten
percent represented a substantial number of lawful uses.120 This
reading of Sony differed from the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of Aimster, which favored the Sony passage stating that the product
must be “capable of commercially significant noninfringing
uses.”121
Under Aimster, the Seventh Circuit would weigh the alleged
commercial viability of the substantial noninfringing uses against
the infringing uses.122 However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
this case was distinguished from Aimster because Grokster and
StreamCast actually brought forth evidence showing legitimate
uses.123 The record deal that resulted from debuting the band’s
work and the fact that Grokster had been used to share public
domain works created a sufficient probability that they had actual
noninfringing uses and were therefore entitled to the Sony
protection.124 Because the defendants’ software was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, the plaintiffs would have to show
that the defendants had actual knowledge of infringement in order
to hold them liable.125
The design of Grokster and StreamCast played a significant
role in the court’s determination of their liability for contributory
infringement.126 The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants did not
have actual knowledge of the direct infringement127 because the
design of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s systems did not allow them
119

Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1162 n.10.
121
Id. at 1160; see also id. at 1162 n.9 (contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation
of the standard in Sony, 464 U.S. at 1161); see In re Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster
II), 334 F.3d 643, 653 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring a weighing of the probabilities alleged
for significant noninfringing uses to show that they could actually be used in
noninfringing ways); see also Miller, supra note 79, at 206 (finding that the Ninth
Circuit’s reading of Sony differed greatly from the Seventh Circuit’s, focusing on the
capability for substantial noninfringing uses).
122
See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653.
123
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 and n.10.
124
Id. at 1161–63.
125
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
126
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
127
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 237; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
120
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to retain lists of the infringing files.128 So, even if both were to
shut down their own computers, users would still be able to
conduct their illegal activities using the defendants’ software.129
Therefore, Grokster’s and StreamCast’s relationship with users
ended when users downloaded the product.130 Thus, the court held
that there was no way to know of or control the infringements by
the time the plaintiffs notified the defendants about the infringing
activity occurring.131 As such, the plaintiffs could not materially
contribute to the infringing activity, or stop them. Therefore,
plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite element of actual
knowledge.
To end the contributory infringement inquiry, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court that Grokster and StreamCast did not
materially contribute to the infringing activities.132 While Napster
had the means to know and track the copyrighted material being
exchanged, the defendants could not, under Fonovisa, provide the
“site and facilities” for the infringement because of the software’s
design.133 Thus, plaintiffs could not satisfy the elements of
knowledge and material contribution and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling on the issue of contributory
infringement.134

128

Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (citing the district court’s finding that even if Grokster
and StreamCast “closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control,
users of their products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption” (quoting
Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041)).
129
Miller, supra note 79, at 207.
130
See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (finding that because no file indices resided on the
defendants’ computers, they did not have the ability to suspend the user accounts).
131
Id. (noting that it is the users of the software who create the network and provide the
access).
132
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 238; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
133
Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163. See supra notes 96–101 for a discussion of the design
of Grokster and StreamCast.
134
Id. at 1163–64 (after agreeing with the district court that defendants do not materially
contribute to copyright infringement, the contributory infringement claim was
exhausted).
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2. Supreme Court Decision
Instead of resolving the split among the Circuit Courts on
interpreting Sony,135 the Supreme Court introduced the theory of
inducement to hold the defendants liable, and vacated the summary
judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast.136 The issue
decided before the Court was, “under what circumstances [is] the
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful
use . . . liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties
using the product[.]”137
Although the Court did not dismiss the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Sony, it held that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding
that Sony shielded the defendants from contributory
infringement.138 The Sony defense could not shield defendants
who were liable for intent to induce infringement.139 Here, the
Court adopted yet another theory of indirect liability from the
Patent Act: “inducement to infringe.”140 According to the Court,
Grokster and StreamCast were liable under this theory and
“inducement” means “one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
is liable” for a third party’s infringement.141
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the
Sony decision when it held that Grokster’s and StreamCast’s
capability for noninfringing uses precluded liability for
contributory copyright infringement.142 According to the Court,
plaintiffs had intended to induce infringement so they were still
liable for contributory copyright infringement, and the Sony
defense did not apply.143 The Supreme Court found that the Ninth
135

See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S.
913, 933 (2005) (the parties and many amici asked the Court to clarify the phrase
“capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses”).
136
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 239; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 941–42.
137
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 918–19.
138
Id. at 933–34.
139
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 239; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 933–34.
140
Miller, supra note 79, at 211.
141
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 919.
142
Id. at 933–34.
143
Id. at 938–40 (illustrating that Grokster and StreamCast had intent to induce).
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Circuit “read Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is
capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held
contributorily liable for third parties’ infringing use of it . . . .”144
Improperly, the Ninth Circuit had broadened the scope of Sony to
protect distributors from any secondary liability theory.145
However, the Supreme Court held that the court should have
inquired further once it determined that the device was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.146
To satisfy the element of intent to induce, the Court adopted
the patent law’s theory of intentional inducement of
infringement.147 According to this theory, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant knowingly aided and abetted another’s direct
infringement.148 The Court then referenced several patent cases to
demonstrate what constituted intent. For example, according to
Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, evidence of improper purpose would
suffice, such as the defendant’s advertising or instruction to entice
or persuade another party to infringe.149 The Court also explained
what would not be considered an intent to induce infringement.
For example, in Sony, there was no evidence suggesting defendants
intended to promote infringing uses of their product.150 Instead,
defendants only had “mere knowledge” that some users would use
the products to infringe.151 Thus, the Court concluded that there
must be evidence of “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”
to be held liable for intent to induce.152

144

Id. at 934.
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the
Ninth Circuit reading was in error because “Sony did not displace other theories of
secondary liability”).
146
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 933–36 (continuing with the inducement theory after
dismissing the Ninth’s Circuit’s reading).
147
See id. at 934–36.
148
Id. at 936. (citing Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (C.A.
Fed. 1988) (liability for inducement where one “actively and knowingly aid[s] and
abet[s] another’s direct infringement” (emphasis omitted))).
149
Id. (citing Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 412–13 (C.A.5 1963)
(demonstrations by sales staff of infringing uses for a patented device supported liability
for inducement)); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240.
150
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 936 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19).
151
Id.
152
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240 (quoting Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937).
145
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Evidence of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s intent to induce
included three main factors.153 First, Grokster and StreamCast
courted Napster users. Some of their courting included making
initial versions of their software compatible with Napster’s
software, advertising to former Napster users,154 and Grokster had
also attempted to direct web searches for Napster to its own site.155
Second, neither Grokster nor StreamCast attempted to develop
filtering tools to diminish infringement.156 Third, both services
indirectly benefited financially from the infringement; their
business model provided that advertising revenue would increase
with the increase of traffic on the website, which was mostly the
result of infringing use.157 The Court noted that neither the second
nor the third factor alone would satisfy the inducement inquiry, but
because the defendants took active steps to induce infringement,
the last two factors strengthened the showing of improper intent.158
The defendants’ evidence therefore satisfied the intent to induce
inquiry for purposes of summary judgment.159
The Court held that Grokster and StreamCast were not
protected from liability by the Sony decision because the evidence
of improper intent overcame the fact that their products had both
infringing and noninfringing capabilities.160 This demonstrates
that the Court focused on the technology providers’ intent and
condemned their bad conduct, rather than attacking the technology
itself.161 Unlike Sony, where the primary purpose of the Betamax
was time-shifting, or fair use,162 the Court found that the main
functions of the services at issue were to assist in the infringing
153

Coats et al., supra note 14, at 240–41; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40.
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939.
155
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241.
156
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939; Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241.
157
Kramer, supra note 73, at 180; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40.
158
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 241; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 939–40 & n.12.
159
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 941.
160
Id. (distinguishing Sony because Sony’s liability was “based solely on distributing a
product with [both] lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users would
follow the unlawful course,” whereas Grokster’s “words and deeds” went beyond
distribution).
161
Kramer, supra note 73, at 182.
162
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 943 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–55, 774 (1984)).
154
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activity.163 The copyright owners submitted abundant evidence of
statements and actions to demonstrate intent to facilitate
infringement.164 Therefore, if an alleged secondary infringer acted
with an improper intent, it would not be shielded by Sony.165 After
determining Grokster’s and StreamCast’s liability, the Court
declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to further substantiate the
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses” standard in Sony.166
However, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer provided some
guidance in its interpretation in their concurring opinions.167
C. Congress’ Role in the Grokster III Case
While the Grokster case was being decided in the courts,
Congress was considering enacting a bill to directly address the
P2P problem, the “Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act 2004”
(“Induce Act”).168 Introduced in June 2004, after the district court
ruled in Grokster I but before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, the bill was discussed in the U.S. Senate for the next
year.169 Both lobbyist and senator sponsors were enraged that the
district court had given Grokster and StreamCast Sony immunity,
so they pushed for this bill to target companies that made and
distributed file-sharing software.170 Effectively, the Induce Act
would add a new cause of action under the copyright statute,
163

Id. at 941 (majority opinion).
See id. at 922–27; see also Miller, supra note 79, at 211–12.
165
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating that, “where
evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement,
Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”).
166
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934.
167
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 942–65.
168
See S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced, June 22, 2004).
169
See Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: Hearing Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing]
(stating that there were no parties advocating a resumption of discussions on the Induce
Act after the Court ruled in Grokster), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat
092805.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
170
See, e.g., Grant Gross, Bill Targets Firms That ‘Induce’ Copyright Violations,
MACWORLD, July 6, 2004, http://www.macworld.com/news/2004/07/06/induce (quoting
Senator sponsor Orin Hatch on the Induce Bill: “It is illegal and immoral to induce or
encourage children to commit crimes”).
164
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allowing a copyright owner to sue anyone who “intentionally aids,
abets, induces, or procures” a third-party to commit
infringement.171 Intent would be inferred from “all relevant
information” that is “reasonably available to the alleged inducer,
including whether the [inducer’s] activity relies on infringement
for its commercial viability.”172 Any inducer found liable under
the Act would be subject to all the remedies provided for copyright
infringement.173
Like the plaintiffs in Grokster, this bill focused on the current
“primary purpose” of the technology.174
This required
examination of both the probability of alleged potential uses and
existing uses to determine whether or not a product or service was
intended to be used primarily to infringe.175 However, one can
draw from the Sony example to see how this is problematic. If this
bill were enacted twenty-two years ago, the VTR would be
obsolete.176 Evidence that Sony actively encouraged infringement
would be determined by its primary uses and any probable
capabilities at the time.177 According to Justice Breyer in Grokster
171

S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (as introduced June 22, 2004); Steve Seidenberg, Congress
Might Run Roughshod Over Sony Ruling, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 6.
172
S. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (as introduced June 22, 2004); Seidenberg, supra note 171,
at 6.
173
Seidenberg, supra note 171, at 6.
174
Cf. Reply Brief For Motion Picture Studio and Recording Co. Petitioners at 8, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 04-480 (U.S. March 18, 2005)
(stating that “a defendant should be liable whenever infringement is the principal or
primary use”). The Induce Act would require looking at all relevant available evidence
to determine whether or not an alleged inducer is inducing users to infringe. Both the
Induce Act and the plaintiffs in Grokster thus wanted to weigh the probability of all
alleged potential noninfringing uses against infringing uses. For the Induce Act, this
would determine the alleged inducer’s “intent,” and for the plaintiffs in Grokster, this
would determine the “primary purpose” of the product or service. Id.
175
Id. (defining primary use: “[w]here the primary use is infringement, the defendant is
fairly said to be in the business of infringement, not ‘substantially unrelated’
commerce”).
176
See Kramer, supra note 73, at 173.
177
See id. However, it is worth noting that analog media, like the videocassettes VTR’s
used, degrade with every copy and cannot survive in the long run. Digital pirating of
music and video clips, on the other hand, is as good as the original copy. So, while the
production of the VTR set the stage for a video rental market, digital pirating precludes,
and has substantially reduced, the market for purchasing physical copies of music and
video clips. But this is not to say that a viable market for purchasing digital copies does
not exist. iTunes and Napster have been extremely successful in the combat against
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III, ninety-one percent of the VTRs’ uses were unauthorized, so
Sony would have been enjoined from manufacturing any more of
them.178 Moreover, had this been the rule of law then, unforeseen
noninfringing uses, like the video rental market, would be
precluded even before they were thought up.179 Thus, the Induce
Act would effectively remove from the “substantial noninfringing
uses” inquiry, the unforeseen noninfringing uses a product may be
capable of; these potential uses could not be used to weigh with
current noninfringing uses against current infringing uses in
determining whether the product should be given protection under
Sony.180
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Grokster III was
announced, discussions over the bill did not resume.181 Some
believed that the inducement theory was the Court’s own version
of the Induce Act, accommodating products capable of
“commercially significant noninfringing uses”182 and products
capable of potential noninfringing uses.183 However, like the
Induce Act, the inducement theory adopted by the Court may limit
the significance of the Sony protection. One of the primary
differences between the Induce Act and the inducement theory is
that the Induce Act would limit the Sony inquiry to “commercially
digital piracy. Thus, the Sony test is still applied the same way for videocassettes and
digital copying. But their effects on the market for physical copies were extremely
different in both cases. Id.
178
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913,
950–51 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (determining that approximately nine percent of
the VTR’s uses were authorized).
179
See id. at 954–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that there may be unforeseen
noninfringing uses of P2P software that may develop later, like the video rental market
after the VTR was determined to have noninfringing uses).
180
See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 171, at col. 1 (finding that under the Induce Act,
Sony would not have been liable as a contributory infringer, but would have been found
guilty of inducing infringement. That would lead to the injunction against any further
sale of VTRs).
181
See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169.
182
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
183
See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169. (stating that
“[t]he Court’s ruling struck an appropriate balance between the rights of copyright
holders and the flexibility necessary to enable and encourage technologists to continue to
develop new products”); see also, Kramer supra note 73 at 177–78 (copyright holders
would want a test for “commercially significant noninfringing uses” while technologists
would want a test for “capable of substantial noninfringing uses”).
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significant noninfringing” uses, whereas the inducement theory
may halt the Sony inquiry altogether, if read inappropriately.184
The factors used to hold Grokster and StreamCast liable were seen
as a way to balance the worries of both the critics and proponents
of the Induce Act.185 They were meant to clearly illustrate the
intent to induce, but because the theory is new, it is not clear how
those factors would be applied to other products capable of both
infringing and noninfringing uses.186 Another important difference
is that, according to the Court, evidence that the product could
have been designed differently would not be nearly as probative
without other evidence of clear, affirmative steps to induce.187 Had
the Court not imposed this limitation on the intent to induce, many
technologies would potentially be susceptible to the theory, since it
could be alleged that they could have been designed in another
way to prevent infringing uses.188 Also, the lack of filters could be
used as evidence that the producers intended to induce
infringement. Such evidence would probably weigh heavily
against evidence of commercially significant noninfringing uses,
especially in the case of the Apple TV.
The Apple TV enables digital content, such as digital music
clips and video clips, to be streamed from any computer running
Mac OS X or Microsoft Windows onto an enhanced-definition or
high-definition widescreen television.189 In a way, it acts like
Grokster and StreamCast because it does not store the digital

184

See Kramer, supra note 73 at 181–82 (for a discussion of the Court’s conflicting
interpretations of the Sony defense). For a discussion on the Court’s inducement theory,
see infra Part IV.
185
See Protecting Copyright and Innovation Hearing, supra note 169 (discussing the
balancing of rights of the opposing parties).
186
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 940
(2005) (stating that, “[Grokster’s] unlawful objective is unmistakable”); see also id. at
936 n.11 (stating that, “[i]nducement has been codified in patent law.” This shows that
the theory did not exist in copyright law before this case).
187
See id. at 939 n.12.
188
See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (determining that it was crucial that the Court
did not hold that a company could be liable strictly because the product could have been
designed differently. Products like the iPod could have been found to have been
designed differently and therefore liable).
189
Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited
Feb. 27, 2007).
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content itself.190 Instead, like other STBs, it converts the digital
content found on up to five nearby computers into analogue
pictures and sounds;191 that is, into the information one watches or
hears on his or her television set. Thus, like the defendants in
Grokster III, Apple supplies copyright infringers with the unit they
need to further infringe copyrights. So if Apple advertised “Rip,
Mix, Burn” to potential Apple TV users, like it did to its iPod
users, should it be held liable for inducing infringement?
Although Grokster III was sufficient to preclude a primary
purpose rule, it could also preclude the development of products
like the Apple TV.192 The Court’s opinion in Grokster III raises
the issue of whether inducement is a new theory of liability under
copyright law or an extension of contributory infringement.193 The
majority opinion seems to indicate that inducement is an element
of contributory infringement194 but the theory may be viewed as a
new theory of liability because it draws from patent law cases to
define intent to induce.195 The Court stated that it was adopting the
rule from patent law just as it adopted the “staple article of
commerce doctrine” in Sony, and under patent law, inducement
and contributory infringement are separate causes of action.196
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think the Court is creating a
new theory for secondary liability in copyright law.197 Moreover,
the Court refused to further clarify the inducement standard’s
relationship to Sony after it found defendants liable under the

190

Id.
Id.
192
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 934
(2005) (declining requests to revisit Sony); Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (stating that
the Court did not adopt the “principal use” test).
193
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242.
194
See id.; Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 930 (stating that, “[o]ne infringes contributorily by
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement”).
195
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (referencing patent law cases to illustrate intent to
induce).
196
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (inducement), with § 271(c) (contributory); see also
Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43.
197
Compare Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating that the Sony analysis reflected patent
law’s traditional article of commerce doctrine), with id. at 936 & n.11 (stating the rule of
inducement was developed in early cases and then references patent cases. It also says
that inducement was codified in patent law); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43.
191
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theory,198 so we do not know whether it was a separate cause of
action defendants were held potentially liable under, or a rebuttal
to the Sony defense.
If the inducement theory is a new cause of action and plaintiffs
have evidence against manufacturers and distributors similar to the
evidence that implicated Grokster and StreamCast, it seems
reasonable for copyright holders to try and find defendants liable
under this theory before going through the traditional contributory
infringement theory.199 Holding defendants liable under a new
cause of action preempts defendants from using the Sony
defense.200 However, reading the new inducement theory in this
way creates liability for new technologies worthy of the Sony
defense, whether they have commercially significant noninfringing
uses or the capability for substantial noninfringing uses. Although
any staple article of commerce can be used to illustrate this point,
the Apple TV will be used because it is one of the newest products
of digital technology today.
III. POST-GROKSTER III WORLD: HOW DO COURTS NOW HOLD
MANUFACTURERS AND DISTRIBUTORS OF PRODUCTS
CAPABLE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABLE?
A. The Apple TV Illustrates How Grokster III Should Not Be Read
A “fake complaint” was brought by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (“EFF”) when the Induce Act was being considered by
Congress.201 It was meant to show how the Induce Act could be
used to hold Apple responsible for secondary liability if it were
implemented.202 However, drawing from some of the arguments in
this complaint may show that Apple could also be held liable for

198

Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934.
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 935 (stating, “Sony’s staple-article rule will not
preclude [intent to induce] liability”); Coats et al., supra note 14, at 242–43.
200
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934–35 (holding that protection under Sony from
traditional contributory infringement will not preclude a finding of intent to induce).
201
See generally Cindy A. Cohn & Jason M. Schultz, Prelude to a Fake Complaint,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., June 24, 2004, http://www.eff.org/IP/Apple_Complaint.php.
202
See id. (“If this bill had been law in 2000, there would be no iPod.”).
199
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contributory infringement with the Apple TV under the
Grokster III decision, if the decision is not read properly.
If one applies the main factors used to hold Grokster and
StreamCast liable under the inducement theory before considering
the Sony defense or traditional contributory liability, it is possible
that Apple will be held liable for Grokster-like behavior. Recall
that Grokster and StreamCast courted copyright infringing users,
refused to develop filtering tools and indirectly derived revenue
from the high volume of infringing uses.203 Also, recall that the
Supreme Court expressly stated that the last two factors standing
alone would not be enough to give rise to liability.204 In applying
the first factor, one might argue that Apple courted copyright
infringing users. Apple advertised to its iPod customers that they
could “Rip, Mix, and Burn” their music or videos.205 For iPods,
this meant taking music or videos users had on their hard drive,
mixing the tracks onto a playlist, and burning them onto the
iPod.206 This clearly satisfies the elements of direct copyright
infringement.207 Moreover, the iPod’s wide success as the most
popular MP3-player on the market can be at least attributed to the
copyright infringers’ exposure to advertising.208 Based on the
iPods’ success in facilitating unauthorized downloads of
copyrighted musical works, it crossed the digital music clip world
and entered the digital video clip world, first with the Video iPod,
and now with the Apple TV.209 Although, at the time of this note,
statistics for the success of the Apple TV are unavailable, it has the
potential to play anything the iPod can play on a much larger
scale.210 Because the Apple TV acts only as a medium and not a
storage device, it can receive and send countless numbers of digital

203

See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–40.
Id. at 939–41 & n.12.
205
See Bowrey, supra note 7; Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
206
See Bowrey, supra note 7.
207
See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
208
See Lev Grossman, How Apple Does It, TIME, Oct. 24, 2005, at 66, 70; Bowrey,
supra note 7 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 9 (Random House 2001)).
209
See Lev Grossman, supra note 208, at 66, 70; Richard Siklos, Cool, a Video iPod.
Want to Watch ‘Lost’?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005.
210
See Peter Cohen, Apple ‘It’s Showtime!’ Event—Live Coverage, MACWORLD,
Sept. 12, 2006, at http://macworld.com/news/2006/09/12/showtime/index.php?pf=1.
204
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music and video clips to one’s television.211 While Apple
programmed the Apple TV so that it could only play music or
videos downloaded from Apple's iTunes, within days of its release
in March 2007, hackers were able to easily break into the Apple
TV operating system and program the Apple TV to transmit digital
media they had on their hard drive.212 These hackers even left
instructions for other Apple TV purchasers to do the same.213 This
weak attempt to install filters shows that Apple made it too easy
for hackers to reprogram the Apple TV.214 Apple did not and
cannot reasonably expect Apple TV users to spend thousands of
dollars to transfer only legal downloads after spending $299 on the
Apple TV itself.215 According to Grokster III, and the supplied
patent law cases, the product’s capability to transmit endless
amounts of illegal downloads, coupled with its advertisement
211
Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited Mar.
28, 2007).
212
John P. Falcone, Review: Apple TV Best for iTunes Addicts, CNN.COM, Mar. 27,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/ptech/03/27/apple.tv/index.html (discussing
Apple TV’s capability to only play iTunes media). The Apple TV was officially released
on March 21, 2007, and within 10 days of its release, hackers were able to play noniTunes media. See Electronista.com, Apple TV Hack Boots Full Mac OS X, Mar. 31,
2007,
http://www.electronista.com/articles/07/03/31/apple.tv.full.mac.os.x/;
The
Something Awful Forums, We Just Got Xvid Working on the Apple TV, http://forums.
somethingawful.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=2391956; AppleTVHacks.net, Apple
TV Running on a Macbook, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.appletvhacks.net/2007/03/27/
apple-tv-running-on-a-macbook/; AppleTVHacks.net, Booting the Apple TV from a USB
Drive, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.appletvhacks.net/2007/03/26/booting-the-apple-tvfrom-a-usb-drive/. It is worthy to note that as of the writing of this note in April 2007, it
is mostly savvy hackers that can reprogram the Apple TV to play digital content on their
hard drives, but the more hackers keep working on reprogramming Apple TV’s operating
system to play non-iTunes media, and re-writing parts of its operating system, the more
the hackers’ programming instructions become easier to implement. Hence, instructions
for reprogramming the Apple TV will probably eventually be easy enough for any
layperson to do it, also. See Engadget.com, How-To: Play DivX and Xvid on Your Apple
TV, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/04/10/how-to-play-divx-and-xvid-onyour-apple-tv (finding that earlier hacks were less practical for most people who were not
proficient at computer programming, and then giving newer and easier instructions for reprogramming the Apple TV to play non-iTunes media).
213
Electronista.com: Apple TV Hack, supra note 212; Something Awful, supra note
212; AppleTVHacks.net: Apple TV/Macbook, supra note 212; AppleTVHacks.net: Apple
TV/USB, supra note 212.
214
Something Awful, supra note 212 (poster discussing her surprise that Apple did not
put more protection in the Apple TV to prevent hackers from reprogramming it).
215
See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
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campaign, are clear expressions of steps taken by Apple to
encourage infringement.216
With respect to the second factor, Apple refused to adequately
engineer an interactive media product that was not capable of
playing music or video clips in the MP3 format illegal P2P filesharing services used.217 Apple designed the Apple TV to only use
iTunes, yet hackers were easily able to re-program it to play other
digital files soon after it was released. Apple could have designed
the Apple TV with better code encryption.218 While it may not
prevent hackers from eventually figuring out how to re-write the
instructions for the Apple TV to play non-iTunes media, it
probably would have slowed them down, taking longer than ten
days to reprogram it.219 However, Apple chose not to design the
iPod or the Apple TV in a more effective way because playing
only authorized and protected files would be far less popular on
the market and therefore less commercially viable.220 This is
evidenced by Sony’s Networked Walkman,
and its own
experience with its advanced audio coding (“AAC”) format.221
The iPod’s ability to play unprotected MP3 files was used to attract
infringing users and increase its commercial value.222 Knowing
the Apple TV’s high probability for transmitting copyright
infringing files and learning from the commercial success of iPods,
Apple chose not to make the Apple TV in a way that would not let
216
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913,
934 (2005) (“contributory liability for patent infringement may be found where a good’s
‘most conspicuous use is one which will co-operate in an infringement when sale to such
user is invoked by advertisement’ of the infringing use”) (citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1912)); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. R. Specialty Co.,
75 F. 1005, 1007–08 (2d Cir. 1896) (“relying on advertisements and displays to find
defendant’s ‘willingness . . . to aid other persons in any attempts which they may be
disposed to make towards [patent] infringement’”); see also Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 940
n.13 (“Inducement liability goes beyond [encouraging], and the distribution of a product
can itself give rise to liability where evidence shows that the distributor intended and
encouraged the product to be used to infringe”).
217
See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
218
Something Awful, supra note 212.
219
See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
220
Something Awful, supra note 212 (poster opines that Apple probably wanted the
Apple TV to be hacked into).
221
See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1; see also Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
222
See Cohn & Schultz, supra note 201.
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copyright infringing users infringe. Thus, Apple encourages these
users to increase the amount of infringement they perpetuate.223
Lastly, Apple derives a large portion of its revenue from the
high volume of infringing uses. Apple has just begun selling the
Apple TV, so there are not enough sales figures to determine its
success as of yet.224 But one can look to the success of all the
iPods Apple sold in the 2006 fiscal year to gauge Apple’s financial
benefit from exploiting illegal P2P file-sharing.225 These devices
accounted for forty percent of Apple’s 4.36 billion dollars in total
sales by the end of the quarter.226 It also has an estimated seventy
percent of the U.S. market in MP3 players.227 These figures
indicate that a substantial portion of Apple’s revenue is derived
from iPods. Furthermore, most of the music stored on iPods are
not legal, but illegal downloads. From October 2005 to September
2006 (the end of Apple’s fiscal year), Apple sold about
130,000,000 songs on iTunes228 and 39,409,000 iPods.229
Plugging these figures into the equation developed by an amicus
brief in Grokster III, the average iPod holds about three songs
bought from iTunes.230 Apple indeed financially benefits from
infringing uses of its product. With this knowledge, Apple intends
to do the same on a much larger scale with the Apple TV.

223

See id.
Wikipedia.org, Apple TV, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_TV (last visited
Feb. 22, 2007).
225
Steve Dowling, Apple Reports Second Quarter Results, APPLE, Apr. 19, 2006,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2006/apr/19results.html; see also Suzanne Vranica,
Marketers Aim New Ads at Apple video Users, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113867199829460498.html (stating that “Apple doesn’t
release sales figures for the video iPod”).
226
See Dowling, supra note 225.
227
See Nick Wingfield, Keeping iPod Humming Along, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jul. 15,
2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115291714677107410.html (stating that the iPod’s
share in the U.S. MP3 market is more than seventy percent).
228
Liz Einbinder, iTunes Music Store Downloads Top 50 Million Songs, Mar. 15, 2004,
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/mar/15itunes.html (discussing iTunes users as
downloading 2.5 million songs per week and an annual run rate of 130 million songs per
year).
229
Wikipedia.org. iPod sales graph, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ipod_sales.svg.
230
See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1 (providing the calculation for Apple iPods sold
from amicus brief). We cannot take the number of videos sold into consideration since
not all iPods are capable of holding videos.
224
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It is important to note that the Grokster III Court held that,
without evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find
contributory infringement liability if the only evidence of
inducement was that a product capable of substantial noninfringing
uses could have been designed differently to bar copyright
infringement.231 With evidence of active steps to induce, the fact
that the software could have been designed differently would
heighten and further substantiate a contributory infringement
claim.232 Arguably, Apple took those affirmative steps to induce
by distributing a product intended for infringing use and also
advertising that use.233 In light of this evidence, the design of the
software further infers a contributory infringement claim.
If a court finds Apple liable under the inducement theory
without first considering the traditional contributory liability
theory, Apple cannot use the fact that the Apple TV is capable of
substantial noninfringing uses as a defense. With respect to
contributory infringement, the Court makes it clear that the Sony
defense will not protect a defendant from liability when the
plaintiff has evidence of wrongful intent.234 Since there is
evidence of intent to induce here, Apple may be held liable without
a Sony defense to shield it.
B. The Correct Post-Grokster III World:
Reconciliation of Sony and Grokster III
1. The Importance of the Traditional Contributory
Liability Inquiry
The Supreme Court intended the Grokster III holding to be
read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense under the theory of
contributory liability. As shown above, finding a defendant liable
under Grokster III without an inquiry into traditional contributory
231

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 938
n.12 (2005).
232
See id. at 939.
233
Fromberg, 315 F.2d at 412–13 (finding advertising to entice another to infringe may
constitute inducement).
234
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934–35 (referencing the inducement theory and stating that,
“Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”).
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infringement could preclude the development of any product
capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses, as long as it
promotes a use capable of being deemed infringing.235 But, the
Grokster III Court clearly intended to maintain the Sony defense,
as it expressly stated that it wanted to protect technologies capable
of disseminating information widely and rapidly, like the iPod.236
Determining the liability of these producers of information
technology, though, does not require revisiting Sony, but rather a
proper reading of Grokster III.237 Grokster III must be read as a
limit on the Sony defense, no matter how Sony is defined. To give
copyright owners and innovators a new theory of liability without
giving them proper boundaries on how it should be applied would
probably strike the wrong balance between innovation and
dissemination.238
The traditional contributory infringement test is an important
prelude to testing for contributory liability under the inducement
theory.239 It prevents evidence of constructive knowledge from
being used as evidence of “clear expression” or “affirmative steps
to foster infringement.”240 The patent cases the Court uses as
examples to meet this standard are insufficient because it is not
immediately apparent how they are applicable in a copyright
context.241 In fact, liability for inducement to infringe under the
Patent Act has been unclear in patent cases. There has been a split
in the circuit courts for a decade between competing patent cases.
235

See supra Part III.
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Sony shelters MP3
players); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913,
(No. 04-480) (questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is]
noninfringing.” Justice Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who
cannot gauge its unforeseen uses before he has invented it).
237
Kramer, supra note 73, at 185 (stating that the failure to clarify the scope of the
Grokster holding will create some controversy in the courts, which may affect technology
communities).
238
Id. (citing Brief in Support of Issuance of Writ of Certiorari by Amici Curiae Law
Professors at 7, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-480)).
239
Compare Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory
infringement are separate theories under patent law), with Chander & Sunder, supra
note 1.
240
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 919.
241
See, e.g., Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory
infringement are separate theories under patent law).
236
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Some circuit courts focus on patent cases imposing a broader scope
of liability for infringement because of a weaker intent standard,
while other circuit courts focus on patent cases imposing a
narrower scope of liability because of a stronger intent standard.242
The traditional contributory infringement test, however, provides a
sufficient background to make the inducement theory applicable to
copyright law.243 Indeed, “intent to induce” is supposed to be a
high standard since the providers’ actions must be affirmative, and
not merely passive or ambiguous.244 Going through the traditional
contributory infringement test first assures that these steps are
clearly affirmative and allows the courts to differentiate between
evidence of intent, actual knowledge, constructive knowledge and
mere knowledge.
2. The Apple TV Illustrates How Grokster III Must Be Read
Understanding that the inducement theory is a rebuttal to the
Sony defense, plaintiffs would initially bring a case for
contributory infringement against defendants in its traditional
form. Defendants would assert the Sony defense and the court
would consider that defense first.245 While the Court’s majority
opinion in Grokster III does not give any indication of how Sony
should be applied, one may look to the concurring decisions in
Grokster III to determine whether or not the Sony protection
applies to the Apple TV.246 As illustrated by Sony and the circuit

242

Oswald, supra note 25, at 226.
Compare Coats et al., supra note 14, at 243 (stating that inducement and contributory
infringement are separate theories under patent law), with Chander & Sunder, supra note 1.
244
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937 (stating that “[t]he inducement rule . . . premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”).
245
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154,
1160 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’g, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I),
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d by, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig.
(Aimster II), 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
(Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001).
246
See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 914–15 (clarifying the “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” rule).
243
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courts, determining the level of knowledge is important to a
finding of contributory liability.247
Under both concurring opinions, the Apple TV would be
entitled to the Sony protection. Like the VTR, the Apple TV is
capable of noninfringing uses, such as what could be described as,
“place-shifting.” 248 Place-shifting means downloading music or
video clips from a legal source—for example, a purchased CD or
iTunes—onto one’s hard drive, and using the Apple TV to place
that digital content on the television screen.249 Though, like the
VTR, the Apple TV could be used for infringing purposes, such as
transferring unauthorized copies of music and movies and loading
them onto one’s TV.250 As will be shown below, even if Apple
knew that many buyers would use the Apple TV for transferring
unauthorized copyrighted work, it would still be insufficient to

247

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)
(stating that, “[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on [petitioners] in this case, it must
rest on the fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge . . . . There is
no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a
theory.”); see also Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154; Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643; Napster II,
239 F.3d 1004.
248
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that “one potential use of the Betamax plainly
satisfies [the capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses] standard . . .
private, noncommercial time-shifting . . .”); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (1999) (defining “space-shifting” as taking
one’s legally owned music or audiovisual recording and putting it on another device for
personal use). In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended the doctrine of Sony to spaceshifting.
The court ruled that this was legitimate and constituted substantial
noninfringing use. This decision paved the way for other companies, like Apple, to enter
the MP3 player market. See Lauren Elizabeth, Contributory Infringement, EVERYTHING2,
Dec. 9, 2005, http://everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=1768993. However, at least in
Apple iPod’s case, most of the files contained in the average iPod is not legal and
whether or not that portion of legal files actually constitute a “substantial noninfringing
use” has not been determined or affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Chander & Sunder,
supra note 1. That is why defining “substantial noninfringing uses” is the single most
important question technology innovators want answered. See Grokster III, 545 U.S.
at 934 (rejecting the request of parties and amici to revisit Sony).
249
Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am., 180 F.3d at 1079. Note that space-shifting is the
legal term for “Rip, Mix, Burn.” The combination of “rip,” “mix” and “burn” is derived
from internet lingo that could also mean “ripping” off unauthorized copies of copyrighted
work. See Bowrey, supra note 7.
250
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24; Chander & Sunder, supra note 1. As users “shift”
music and video clips from one device onto another (convenient) device, users would
also “shift” their music and video clips from one room to another room.
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hold Apple contributorily liable because its noninfringing uses
would be deemed significant under both readings of Sony.251
Justice Ginsburg argues in her concurring opinion that the
defendants’ software in Grokster III did not meet the Sony
standard.252
She focuses on the “commercially significant
noninfringing uses” passage of Sony and argues that Grokster’s
evidence of noninfringing uses do not give rise to a reasonable
belief that those uses would become substantial in the future.253
While Sony offered evidence that the VTR’s substantial
noninfringing uses had reasonable prospects for developing,254
Grokster’s or StreamCast’s evidence of noninfringing uses was
anecdotal and could not outweigh the evidence offered by
plaintiffs that Grokster and StreamCast were overwhelmingly used
for infringement.255 As opposed to Grokster and StreamCast’s
evidence, though, Apple’s evidence of noninfringing uses—legal
digital file-downloading (and then transferring)—is commercially
viable, as is evidenced by iTunes’ success, especially since more
video distributors are jumping on board iTunes.256
Under Justice Breyer’s reading of Sony, the iPods’ capability
for “commercially significant noninfringing uses” and “substantial
noninfringing uses” are both important.257 He takes both into
consideration because Sony used the word “capable” for the
general inquiry into whether a product was “capable of substantial
noninfringing uses” in the future, and it also used the word
“commercial” to qualify the legal inquiry that needed to be
satisfied by the VTR.258 Applying this rationale to the Apple TV,

251

See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 949–50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 948 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
253
Id.
254
Id. at 943.
255
Id. at 946.
256
See, e.g., Apple.com, 1 Billion Songs, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.apple.com/uk/
itunes/1billion/ (stating that the one billion songs sold since iTunes opened is a major
force against piracy, and that iTunes is the most popular video download store).
257
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 955 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that, “the
foreseeable development of such uses, when taken together with an estimated
[unforeseen] 10% non-infringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony’s standard”).
258
Id. at 948 (stating that the Sony Court wrote that a product “need merely be capable
of substantial non-infringing uses,” (emphasis omitted) but that the legal question in
252
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actual evidence exists to show that its noninfringing uses are
commercially viable.259 Moreover, with Apple’s interactive media
products constantly expanding—from its first portable player’s
capacity to hold digital music, to a player capable of holding
pictures, and then videos, and now Apple TV—there is nothing to
indicate that more similar noninfringing uses of the product will
not continue as a consequence of its character.260
Continuing with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of contributory
infringement, the Apple TV will still be protected under Sony.261
Once it is determined that the product is capable of substantial
noninfringing uses, plaintiffs must prove that Apple had actual
knowledge of specific acts of infringement to be held liable for
contributory infringement.262 The strongest evidence against
Apple showing intent to induce is its capability to transfer large
amounts of digital music and video clips, which are both
authorized and unauthorized, and its original advertisement to
“Rip, Mix, Burn.”263 While other evidence could be used to show
actual knowledge for another producer’s alleged contributory
infringement, this is the strongest evidence against Apple that
could be used to test its actual knowledge. However, at most, its
advertisement campaign and Apple TV’s capacity to transfer large

Sony’s particular case was, “whether [Sony’s VTR] is capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses”) (alteration in original).
259
See, e.g., 1 Billion Songs, supra note 256.
260
See Grossman-Cupertino, supra note 208 (inquiring into what Apple would come up
with in 2006); see also Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 955. Justice Breyer also argued that the
ten percent of authorized sharing done on Grokster and StreamCast was comparable to
the amount of authorized use that the Court found to be significant in Sony, which was
about nine percent. If we take the calculated figures for authorized use above, authorized
music uses in an iPod amount to about 0.03 percent. See supra notes 228–229. Their
capacity for noninfringing uses is nonetheless commercially significant. And their
potential for unforeseen non-infringing uses is also viable. Thus, Justice Breyer would
agree that it should be entitled to the Sony defense.
261
Note that, even if in practice, courts would consider the inducement theory before
applying the traditional contributory infringement test, the traditional test would
eventually be applied and it would still differentiate between the different types of
knowledge and liabilities.
262
See A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir.
2001).
263
See supra notes 231–232 (finding under patent law cases cited in Grokster III, this
could constitute inducement).
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amounts of digital content would show that Apple had constructive
knowledge of the infringement.264 Unlike Napster and Grokster,
Apple does not have any direct involvement in the infringing
activity based on this evidence.265 It does not maintain any
significant relationship with its customers and its advertisement is
not a set of directions on how to obtain unauthorized copies of
digital files.266 In fact, like the defendants in Sony, Apple may
only have had mere knowledge of actual infringing uses.267 Mere
knowledge exists when a defendant distributes a product knowing
it can be used to infringe without having any involvement with the
infringement occurring, and it is highly arguable that Apple did
this.268
Evidence that Apple tried to prevent copyright
infringement by designing it only to play digital clips bought on
iTunes at most shows that Apple had mere knowledge that the
product could be used to infringe, but does not show that it
encouraged direct infringement.
If one also extends the knowledge inquiry and applies the
Ninth Circuit timing test in Grokster III, Apple did not have actual
knowledge at a time when it could prevent the infringing conduct
because its relationship with its customers ended after they
purchased the product.269 This is also why Apple could not have

264

See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5 (determining that evidence of constructive
knowledge included Napster’s promotion of the site with advertisements of infringing
files).
265
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–40; Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021–22 (finding that
Napster’s central database index helped copyright infringers infringe); Coats et al., supra
note 14, at 234, 241.
266
See supra notes 201–216. See also Bowrey, supra note 7.
267
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 937.
268
Id. (finding that the Sony Court did not find intentional inducement despite the
knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe); see also
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 439 n.19 (1984).
Recall that “Rip, Mix, Burn” could also mean space-shifting (see supra note 249), which
many people in the Internet community are aware of. This leaves only the fact that it
built an iPod with a large capacity to be used against Apple. This is evidence of mere
knowledge since Apple would only be distributing a product capable of infringement.
269
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster Ltd. (Grokster II), 380 F.3d 1154,
1162–63 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Grokster did not have knowledge at a time when it
could materially contribute to the infringing activity because the system’s architecture
would not allow it to maintain an ongoing relationship with its users).
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“substantially participated” in the infringement or have provided
the “site and facilities” for the conduct to continue.270
3. The Inducement Doctrine as a Rebuttal to the Sony Defense
Taking what was learned from the application of traditional
contributory infringement above, the elements of the inducement
theory will again be applied. First, Apple did not court copyright
infringing users with its advertisement or by building the Apple
TV with a large capacity. This is evidence of constructive
knowledge at best and intent requires a stronger showing, such as
the direct assistance Grokster gave copyright infringing users.271
Inquiry into the next two factors requires the first element to
succeed as evidence of Apple’s intent to induce because those are
the affirmative steps Apple would be making to encourage
infringement.272 But now that the requisite intent is not met, the
fact that the Apple TV could have been designed differently to bar
copyright infringement, or that it receives a large portion of its
revenue from the iPod’s infringing uses will not by themselves
prove contributory infringement.273 Unless evidence of the last
two factors is probative enough, Apple is most likely shielded from
liability under Sony.274 Moreover, because Apple took affirmative
steps to prevent copyright infringement, including advertised use
of the Apple TV with iTunes, it is likely that evidence of the last
two factors would not be enough to implement Apple.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court meant for the Grokster III holding to be
read as a rebuttal to the Sony defense under the theory of
contributory liability. The contributory liability theory provides

270

Id.
See supra notes 153–159 and accompanying text.
272
Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 938–41 & n.12.
273
See id.
274
Id. at 935 (holding that, “where evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or
the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”
Apple does not meet this standard).
271
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significant background in differentiating between the actual
knowledge, constructive knowledge, mere knowledge, and intent a
producer may have to determine its ultimate liability. To apply the
inducement theory as a separate theory of secondary liability
would give plaintiffs a new cause of action like the “fake
complaint” drawn up by the EEF.275 Misunderstanding the
inducement theory would probably eliminate the balance Sony
intended to maintain: between protecting innovation and providing
for dissemination.276 Reading the decision inaccurately would
preclude the distribution of products worthy of the Sony defense.
And indeed, a number of cases that have applied the Grokster III
decision properly read the inducement theory as a part of the
traditional test for contributory infringement.277 In Grokster III,
the majority opinion did not revisit the Sony decision, but it did not
intend to overrule it either.278 The Court did not intend for the
Grokster III decision to enjoin the distribution of interactive media
players, like the Apple TV.279 Of course, whether a product is
entitled to the Sony protection because it is capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses or because it is
capable of substantial noninfringing uses is for the courts to decide
on a case-by-case basis.280 The different theories of contributory
infringement, though, set boundaries on that entitlement.281 And it
is those boundaries that limit the abuse of Sony and allow
275

See supra note 201.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 416, 442 (1984).
277
Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. 03-2670, 2006 WL 842883 (D.N.J.
Mar. 31, 2006); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see
Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
278
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 545 U.S. 913, 934
(2005).
279
Grokster III at 957 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Sony shelters MP3 players);
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Grokster III, 545 U.S. 913, (No. 04-480)
(questioning plaintiffs’ proposed test for a “majority use [that is] noninfringing.” Justice
Breyer argues that it presents problems for the iPod inventor who cannot gauge its
unforeseen uses before he has invented it).
280
See Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (majority opinion) (holding that it will not revisit
Sony and quantify its holding to settle the split in the courts. Instead, it will leave it to
further consideration when it may be required).
281
See, e.g., id. at 934–95 (stating that nothing in Sony precludes evidence of intent to
hold a producer liable); A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004,
1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring a showing of actual knowledge of infringing activity
to overcome a Sony defense).
276
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legitimate technologies to further develop.282 Manufacturers and
distributors of digital technology today, like Apple CEO Steve
Jobs, are therefore freer to continue re-inventing products of
information technology.

282

See generally Grokster III, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s view of
Sony “was error, converting the case from one about liability resting on imputed intent to
one about liability on any theory.” But Sony did not displace other theories of secondary
liability).

